




JULY 1957

VOL. I, No. 1


OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
american society
for
industrial security

Office Copy
16
★ industrial ★
★ security ★
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TO COLONEL ALEXANDER SPOTSWOOD

Headquarters, Morris Town, April 30, 1777



*"Put none
but Americans
on guard tonight."*

— WASHINGTON

Sir: I want to form a Company for my Guard. In doing this I wish to be extremely cautious; because it is more than probable, that in the Course of the Campaign, my *Baggage, Papers, and other Matters of great public Import, may be committed to the Sole care of these Men.* This being premised, in order to impress you with proper attention in the Choice, I have to request that you will immediately furnish me with four Men of your Regiment, And, as it is my further wish, that this Company should look well and be nearly of a Size, I desire that none of the Men may exceed in Stature 5 feet 10 Inches, nor fall Short of 5 feet 9 Inches, Sober, Young, Active and well made. When I recommend care in your Choice, I would be understood to mean *Men of good Character* in the Regiment, that possess the pride of appearing clean and Soldierlike. *I am satisfied there can be no absolute security for the fidelity of this Class of people,* but yet yet I think it most likely to be found in those who have Family Connections in the Country. *You will therefore send me none but Natives,* and Men of some property, if you have them. I must insist, that in making this Choice, you give no Intimation of my preference of Natives, as I do not want to create any invidious Distinction between them and the Foreigners. I am etc.

GEORGE WASHINGTON

★ industrial ★ security ★

Vol. I, No. 1

JULY 1957

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PAUL HANSEN

FOUNDER, CHARTER MEMBER AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, WHOSE VISION, GUIDANCE AND ENTHUSIASM BROUGHT OUR ORGANIZATION INTO BEING AND CONTRIBUTED EMINENTLY TO ITS PROGRESS.—*Quotation from the plaque presented to Paul Hansen at the Second Annual Convention of the Society in Washington, D. C. on October 3, 1956.*

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The Book of Genesis

Section 1 Genesis

Chapter 1

- 1 *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.*
- 2 *And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God was waving over the face of the waters.*
- 3 *And God said, Let there be light; and there was light.*
- 4 *And God saw the light that it was good; and God divided between the light and the darkness.*
- 5 *And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And it was evening and it was morning, the first day.*

american society for industrial security



Dedication

The moment we have all awaited has arrived. Our child, in the form of a Society magazine, has been born. It now makes its first public appearance amongst the professional journals of the Nation. From this modest beginning we look forward to the future with optimism and with hope that our newly born babe will grow in stature and be ever mindful of its purpose in life.

It is our purpose to give light and extend knowledge in the industrial security profession. Through these pages and columns we will provide timely and helpful information for our members. Every member is expected, however, to contribute his knowledge for the common good of all. These pages will be the means to do this.

It is our purpose to enhance the security profession so that the industrial strength of our Country will be preserved and thus help to insure peace. This must be done to safeguard America's freedom.

It is our purpose, with God's help, to protect the people who work in the plants throughout our Land, to protect the plants themselves and to protect the goods they produce. Along with these, it is also our purpose to protect the transportation, communications and power systems upon which industry depends and all other institutions which are an integral part of the industrial complex of the Nation.

To these purposes this Magazine is dedicated.

Russell E. White

President
American Society for
Industrial Security

Industrial Security in

THE other day I was standing on the stern of a company speed launch on my way across Lake Maracaibo, in Western Venezuela. I was headed for the La Salina District, located on the Lakes western shore. The Lake was dotted with Creole oil wells, representing one million plus barrels of crude per day, a part of the more than one billion dollars in capital investment made in Venezuela by my company, the Creole Petroleum Corporation. I mentally shook my head, and looking at the miles of wells stretching on into the lake horizon, thought, "Adkins, you must have been out of your mind to think you could protect all this."

I didn't protect it all but only lead a team that did. They were members of the security organization, aided by management representatives, thousands of other loyal employees, and competent and cooperative public authorities.

A large number of the ASIS members have joined

the ranks of professional security men as a direct result of the FBI Plant Protection Surveys made in the early days of World War II. Most of us have encountered the same things, i. e., poorly selected, untrained guard forces; lack of specific physical plant protection programs; unorganized fire protection groups; lackadaisical passive defense; and many other phases of sloppiness and inefficient operation. I shall try to avoid a recap of these familiar things, and try to stick to the things which make a security operation in a foreign country—foreign, that is, to the United States—different and, in many ways, more difficult than in the U. S. A.

VENEZUELA AND CREOLE

First, let me orient the reader with a little geography, national statistics and a bird's eye view of Creole. The geography he will need—in most instances. I never go home but what some one says to me, "Oh, you're from South America. You must know Joe

LAKE MARACAIBO OIL FIELDS

The over water oil fields offer some unusual Industrial Security problems

in Creole

By: E. H. ADKINS, JR.
Coordinator of
Industrial Service
Creole Petroleum Corporation
Caracas, Venezuela



Blow, he lives in Rio de Janeiro." And Rio located farther from Caracas than New York in a country half again as big as the States*. The statistics and compaany we will try to make interesting.

Venezuela, the northernmost country of South America, was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1498 on his third voyage to the New World. The next year after Columbus' discovery, Alonso de Ojeda, a Spanish conquistador, followed him to the new land and sailed into Lake Maracaibo, which Columbus had not visited. He found native houses built on stilts over the waters of the lake, and this led him to call the place Venezuela (little Venice), thus baptizing the country with the name it bears today. It is the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined and is located about 2,000 miles south of New York City. The latest government estimate places the population at slightly better than 6 million people. The lowlands are hot, but nothing like the extremes reached in New York, Kansas City or Houston. However, Caracas, the capital, is about 3,500 feet above sea-level with an absolute maximum temperature of 80 degrees and a minimum of 50 degrees. A truly air-conditioned city. Spanish is the national language and the basis of the culture. Some 60,000 U. S. citizens live in Venezuela and are called "M'sieu," a derivative from the French when they were very active here.

The Creole Petroleum Corporation is an integrated oil company that operates in Venezuela, engaging in all the basic functions of the industry; searching for, producing, refining, transporting, and marketing oil.

Creole is a member of the "Jersey family," which consists of the affiliates of the Standard Oil Compa-

ny (New Jersey). It is presently the largest producer of crude oil in the world. In 1956 Creole produced an average of 1,080,000 barrels of crude per day, with a profit in excess of \$336,000,000. Compare this production figure, which has now reached 1,200,000 barrels per day, to that of Texas which in 1956 produced an average for all oil companies there of about 3,000,000 barrels per day.

The Company's success has been due to two chief circumstances: the encouragement and cooperation provided by Venezuela to foreign investment and private enterprise, and the Company's determined effort to reciprocate through scrupulous adherence to Venezuelan laws and customs and through identification of itself and its employees as a part of the Venezuelan community.

But this carries with it a burden. Realize, if you will, that last year Creole contributed better than 30% of the total national revenue to the Venezuelan treasury. Therefore, the company problems, including those of security, carry a substantial impact on the economy and social life of the nation. This, then, is the distinctive common denominator underlying all problems.

BEGINNINGS

The beginnings were tough. But we held an invaluable trump card. The security program was initiated by, and since then has been backed by top management.

It was essential that the beginnings be handled quietly and carefully. After all, we were, and are, guests in the country. Public and employee relationships must be approached carefully. Neither by inference nor implication must we give the idea that we were establishing a "foreign police force" or "gestapo."

(Continued on page 8)

*Note: I might know Joe at that. I spent three wonderful, bachelor years in Rio.

CREOLE Continued

The name of the organization therefore became important. "Industrial Service" was chosen. It translates well, does not conflict with the translation of Safety (Industrial Security and Industrial Safety translate identically), and carries no connotation of any national law enforcement agency.

As you would expect, the guard force, since it was already in being received first attention. A big problem was that there were no known guard manuals in Spanish. The Stateside manuals did not fit local conditions, so it was not a simple problem of translation. We assigned one of our American supervisors to the job of putting one together in Spanish. Utilizing* Ross Miller's North American Aviation guard manual as a guide—he and I wrote that one back in 1944—we batted out one in Spanish in a few months. (And I can safely say that it is the World's best in Spanish, for as far as I know it is the only one). With this we began our training on a formal basis, which has been essentially the same as in any modern industry. Coincident with this, we had to manufacture some Spanish-speaking security men. This I mean literally. We were able to employ some security men, and we were able to employ some bi-lingual law enforcement officers. So we had to teach Spanish on one hand and security on the other.

In the beginning we were not able to call on any local talent for the key supervisory jobs. Big industry had not yet developed them. However, we are now developing many fine, young Venezuelan men and training them for supervisory jobs as Venezuela develops into an industrial nation. About 3-1/2% of our entire security organization are foreigners—or American.

Protection of company personnel is of prime importance in any industry. But the situation we had to face is somewhat different from that of most industry today; protection against wild Indians. About

90 air miles southwest of Maracaibo, second city in Venezuela with a population of about 250,000, lies the Rio Negro running from the Andes on the Venezuelan-Colombian border eastward through a dense, tropical rain forest to Lake Maracaibo. Near the Negro lives a tribe of untamed savage Indians called Motilones, who have resisted, with well placed arrows, all attempts to civilize them. Many ranchers and oil workers have been killed by these savages. Creole decided to drill an oil well at Alturitas, just 12 miles north of a Motilon village. At certain times of the year the Indians are at this and other nearby villages from which they make their raids. Protection for our workers was relatively simple. A clearing roughly a mile in diameter was bulldozed around the well site and perimeter lighting was installed. All operations and housing were kept well to the center. In the many months of activity no difficulty was experienced.

THE THEFT PROBLEM

The theft problem was and is one of our prime reasons for being, which is no different from any place else. However, it does appear to have been a little more critical for us. Any time a big industry moves into undeveloped areas—and they don't find oil on Main Street except in Los Angeles—and has large supplies of tools, pipe, equipment and other saleable material, it is a prime target for theft, both from within and without. We, of course, established the usual identification and pass systems for control, but backed by a courageous management we went further. In the firm belief that an aggressive prosecutive policy is the greatest single deterrent to theft, we—working together with the local law enforcement authorities—presented the cases in court. And made them stick. Many times I have heard managements in the States duck their civic responsibility by disclaiming, "Bad public relations! Bad for morale!" But after the decision is made, our public and industrial relations people back us up. And the results have been gratifying.

A rather unusual—for industry, that is—problem and solution was that involving theft on Lake Maracaibo. The "Lake," which is about eighty miles long and forty wide, is the location of our largest oil field. We have some 2500 wells, plus two multi-million dollar gas conservation plants, the usual gathering stations and other oil field installations, all located ten to thirty feet above the lake which in places is 100 feet deep. We solved this one by establishing lake patrols in high speed launches, where the guards exercise not only their theft control responsibilities but make fire prevention inspections as well. A local police officer accompanies these patrols.

LAND VIGILANCE

Protection of vast acreages is a responsibility not usually required of most industrial security organizations. However, Creole has almost 3 million acres in concessions rights alone which requires protection. Many of these properties are remote from our centers of operation and must be constantly patrolled against squatters. Without patrols it would be easy for a small farmer or jungle hunter to set up housekeeping on company lands, and after a period of time prescribed by law he would have certain rights for which the company would have to pay if it wished to reclaim the land. Constant patrols are therefore maintained by foot, radio patrol car, and muleback.

SCREENING PROBLEMS

I am sure that no one will take exception to the need for a thorough investigation of the background of new employees. In Creole we conducted more than 3000 applicant investigations in 1956. The bulk of them, of course, were Venezuelan applicants, because they comprise the majority of our employees. These investigations are made by conducting a personal interview wherever the interviewee may be within the Republic. Our investigators have to use mules and dugout canoes in the remoter sections to cover a lead.

Approximately 10% of our em-
(Continued on page 21)

*Note: Ross Miller and Ed Merritt spent two months with me in Venezuela helping us get started.



A. TYLER PORT

SECURITY POLICY in the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Everyone in the industrial security profession should know the man in the Department of Defense who is responsible for the supervision of the Department's security policies and programs including those pertaining to industrial security. This man is Arthur Tyler Port. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed Mr. Port as Director of the Office of Personnel Security Policy on March 22, 1957. This office, which handles all Department of Defense security policy matters, is under Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve, Honorable William H. Francis, Jr., of Houston, Texas. Mr. Port succeeded Jerome D. Fenton who left the Department of Defense to become General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board.

Mr. Port is a government career man with a distinguished record. He was born in Chicago, Illinois on October 4, 1916. He graduated A. B. cum laude Davidson College in 1937 and in 1940 received his LL. B., at Yale. The same year he was admitted to the North Carolina Bar and subsequently practiced law in Winston-Salem.

The major portion of Mr. Port's military service in World War II was taken up with early develop-

ments in the Army Air Corps' guided missile program, in which he started as an enlisted man and rose to commissioned rank in the Signal Corps. Going overseas after the war, he was transferred to the Judge Advocate General's Department where he participated in unraveling many of the thorny legal programs connected with the Army's occupation forces in Europe.

Mr. Port received his discharge from the Service in Frankfurt, Germany in 1946 and began his civilian career as a lawyer for the Theater Judge Advocate, during which time he received several commendations for outstanding work. During the days of the famous Air Lift in 1949, Mr. Port became a member of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor for Germany in Berlin, where he was legal assistant to General Lucius D. Clay's Special Advisor on tripartite military government reorganization. Later in 1949, he was appointed Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Army in Washington, D. C. and was instrumental in the establishment and development of the Department of the Army's Special Staff for Psychological Warfare and Special Operations. In 1951 he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for international affairs and occupied this position until July 1955. During the latter part of this period he served for eighteen months as a member of the Secretary of the Army's Security Review Board. In 1953 he received the Meritorious Civil Service Award of the Army.

Mr. Port was transferred from the Department of the Army to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in August 1955 to become Deputy Director of the Office of National Security Council Affairs. Because

(Continued on page 10)

A. TYLER PORT Director

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
(MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND RESERVE)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A. TYLER PORT *Continued*

of his outstanding ability, he was designated Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Honorable Gordon Gray, a position he held until Mr. Gray was appointed Director of Defense Mobilization early this year. From 1955 until his present assignment, Mr Port was also the Department of Defense member on the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (S-DMICC) which exercises policy coordination and control over the release of classified military information to foreign governments. In this capacity he obtained first-hand, on the ground knowledge of the security systems and practices of many nations throughout the world. His membership on this Committee required extensive travel in every

ground Mr. Port is not a newcomer in the security field and he is well versed in all aspects of internal and international security.

The organizational chart of the Office of Personnel Security Policy shows its four divisions. Mr. Port's Deputy is Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein, USAF. Of special significance is the Industrial Security Programs Division of which Mr. Robert L. Applegate is the Staff Director. This Division confines itself to assisting the Director in the formulation of industrial security policies, practices, and procedures in the establishment of uniform standards for the safeguarding of classified information in the hands of industry. Security operations are performed by the three Military Departments, operating under the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation.

agent for the Department of Defense.

The primary work of this Division is concerned with the:

Preparation and promulgation of the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation.

This is a uniform regulation governing the Military Departments in the implementation of the Industrial Security Program, which is designed to safeguard classified information in the hands of industry. It also prescribes the security clearance of facilities and employees having access to classified information.

Preparation and promulgation of the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information.

This document is an attachment to the Security Agreement prescribed by the Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation and has the effect of a contractual agreement. It establishes the security requirements and standards of the Department of Defense for the protection of classified information made available to industry engaged in classified Defense work and covers in detail such subjects as the handling of classified information; security clearances; control of areas; visitor control procedures; subcontractors, vendors and suppliers; consultants, cryptographic information and graphic arts. The Manual differs from the Regulation in that it applies to industry and governs industry in the implementation of the Program.


Assignment of security responsibility.

This Division performs the necessary staff work for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve) who assigns responsibility for administering the Industrial Security Program in individual industrial facilities to one of the three Military Departments. This assignment is based upon an evaluation of a variety of factors, including the desires of management, the preeminent interest of a given Military Department, etc.

(Continued on page 25)

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY



* Same as dual capacity.

part of the World, where United States armed forces or interests were located. His study of the security programs of these nations included industrial security. As the Defense member of S-DMICC it was essential that he have a thorough knowledge of United States security programs and policies. With this broad and extensive back-

Also under the staff cognizance of this Division is the Central Index Personnel and Facility Security Clearance File (commonly referred to as the Central Index File) and the Industrial Security School, both located at Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland. These two functions are handled by the Department of the Army as executive



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
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BY CLARENCE BRACY
GENERAL CHAIRMAN
THIRD ASIS CONVENTION/SEMINAR

Our Forthcoming Convention

Plans for the Third Annual Convention/Seminar to be held in Washington at the Mayflower Hotel on October 28, 29, and 30 of this year are getting into full swing. The Convention Committee and I hope to make this an outstanding meeting, and I am certain that you will want to mark your calendar now for this important event.

Committees have been formulated for the following functions, and are headed by the members indicated.

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Exhibits | P. C. Wolz, Eastman Kodak Company |
| Registration | T. M. O'Connor, Bendix Aviation Corporation |
| Guest Speakers | S. J. Tracy, Commission on Government Security |
| Accommodations | E. L. Robbins, Reynolds Metals Company |
| Reception | A. T. Deere, The Dow Chemical Company |
| Publicity | R. C. Sprow, Kuthe Laboratories |

The theme which has been selected for this year's Convention/Seminar is "Industrial Security—Lifeguard of the Nation." This theme exemplifies the growing importance of industrial security in our national economy as it is recognized more and more that protection of American industry is a prime requirement to insure industrial production.

The Convention/Seminar program format which was so well received in 1956 will be carried over into 1957. Individual seminars or workshops for various security topics are planned for morning and afternoon sessions with our entire group being assembled for the luncheons at which time persons of national prominence will speak.

The workshops promise to be of interest to all with advance registration available to members prior to Convention time for workshops of their choice. Members are urged to bring pertinent information and/or material to those workshops in which enrolled in order to provide a basis for dissemination of know-how, experience, etc. among those in attendance.

Activities are being planned for wives, and a calendar of these activities will be included with the registration blank when mailed to you the latter part of this Summer. In addition, you may also wish to bring as your guest officials or others from your company—including a member or two from your organization's top echelon. Those guests which you elect to bring will leave Washington favorably impressed with the effort and progress being made by company security and plant protection officers, in effecting better industrial security.

More exhibits for 1957 have been arranged for as a result of the excellent response received in 1956 from members as well as exhibitors. Members will have the opportunity to view the latest in protection-security equipment and discuss specific applications with exhibitors.

Hotel accommodations are excellent and the entire Mayflower staff have pledged themselves to make our stay there most enjoyable. Moderately priced rooms will be available to all, but make sure to return your hotel registration blank as soon as possible after it is mailed to you. You will receive more details about the Convention, but make your plans to attend NOW!

Security's Role in **ENGINEERING TOTAL PEACE**

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR SECURITY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



My address has to do with security, and more particularly internal security. At the outset I should like to define my use of the term. There are several technical definitions of internal security, but for purpose of simplicity and in direct relationship to my subject I offer this definition: The defensive condition of our nation as regards the espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities of our actual or potential enemies.

This is a broad subject with many complex ramifications. Considering the time limitations which necessarily govern my discussion, I pondered at some length in an effort to select those facets of security activity and security problems which were most worthy of consideration by this Conference. An unusual phrase in the Conference announcement describing one of the aims of the Conference "Coordination of different disciplines" suggested the approach I am going to take because the need for coordinating different and even competing disciplines is perhaps greater in the field of internal security than in any other which contributes to the defense of our nation.

Consequently I am going to talk about the why of security, the what of security and the competing disciplines which are dynamically involved in our efforts to achieve security.

In recent times we have been reminded by thoughtful men, and by the literature of this Conference as well, that we have reached that point in our country's life where we are now engaged with the Communist world in a struggle for our "national survival." In context there is an almost frightening sternness about that term "national survival," for by way of alternative it suggests its opposite—national obliteration—should we fail. We have even commenced to use

the expression "never before" to voice our concern and to signify the urgency of our position.

In recognition of this sober truth, as a nation we are endeavoring to develop and maintain a posture of strength to deter aggression and to preserve peace. In the face of formidable competition, we are striving mightily to maintain a safe position of superior military strength, and we are engaged in an intense technological race to maintain the qualitative lead we have enjoyed in the past.

In each area of struggle we recognize the imperative need for a positive defensive reaction; we heed the "call to arms" as it were, and respond even though much of our national income and other national resources, both human and physical, are involved in the effort. This is a necessity clear to all because we must meet this serious threat to our national survival.

Another one of the salient areas of conflict, one of the important areas in which this threat also exists is found in the internal security field. It should be equally clear to all—though to some it is not, that we must take whatever action is necessary to erect adequate defenses here. And we should note that security is not just an "in case" or an "if" requirement. In this field the attack has already been launched. We are being "bombarded" now by the efficient Communist techniques of infiltration, penetration, and surveillance in their effort, among other objectives, to obtain our defense secrets.

The need for protecting military secrets is as old as warfare itself—beyond which the memory of man runneth not. Perhaps the first spy story in literary history is found in the Bible where we are told that Moses sent spies into Canaan to spy out the land. This incident occurred about the year 1490 B. C. Since that time with thousands of years of practice the world has demonstrated an increasing proficiency and a growing aptitude for this clandestine activity, until today there exists in the world, under control of the Soviet Union and the International Communist

(Continued on page 14)

General Carroll is an Honorary Member of the Society. This honor was bestowed upon him in February 1957 because of the great contribution he has made to the security of the Nation. In March of this year, in Chicago, he addressed the National Military-Industrial Conference. The complete text of his address is being printed so that those members of the Society who did not hear General Carroll may read his brilliant dissertation on internal security.

GENERAL CARROLL *Continued*

movement, the most efficient, the most aggressive, and the most insidious world-wide espionage apparatus mankind has ever known.

Considering the balance of forces which prevail in the world today and the present international tensions, I believe it can be stated here without elaboration that this most effective Communist espionage system is focused directly upon the United States.

Any sober analysis should make it clear that Communism poses a real security problem in this country. We need but reflect on the disclosures of the past and observe the substantial inroads which Communism made into our governmental, educational, social and industrial structures. Especially in the field of espionage have the Communists been inordinately successful. This has been amply demonstrated for us in such highly publicized cases as those pertaining to Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Morton Sobel, David Greenglass, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, et al. The arrest, the trial, the conviction of these people represented a substantial measure of accomplishment on the part of the FBI and the Department of Justice. This in turn tended to give rise to a feeling of national accomplishment. After all, the spies were caught. They were brought to justice. They paid the penalty for their crimes.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that each and every one of these individuals as they marched off to jail or to the execution chamber could say "Mission Accomplished"—because they were caught after the harm had been done. And these are not isolated cases. They are merely representative of the extensive espionage activities which the Soviet Union and other elements of the Communist world have mounted against us.

Obviously our *preventive* measures were far from adequate. The national security demanded that these things be stopped *before* they happened and not merely brought to light *after* they happened.

We, who are the prime target of

an antagonist whose goal is total power, might profitably reflect upon the unhappy fate of Olynthus, the ancient City State which was overrun and destroyed by Philip of Macedon. On the morrow of their misfortune those who survived could belatedly think of many things which, if foreseen, could have saved them from destruction. Might it not be well for us to say with Demosthenes, who in commenting on the tragic fate of Olynthus, asserted:

"While the boat is undamaged, then is the time for the sailor and helmsman and all aboard to show unceasing vigilance and prevent anyone from upsetting it, either purposely or accidentally. But when the sea has overwhelmed it, all effort is in vain."

Technology dares not await proof positive of a potential enemy's scientific accomplishments before taking action to catch up. Neither does security await proof positive of a particular offense before taking preventive action. Were it otherwise this nation would be reduced to an after-the-fact indolence, and the Communist refrain of "Mission Accomplished" could be the prelude to our national obliteration.

And so our nation has adopted the preventive security measures which comprise our security program as we know it today.

In recognition of the prime interest which this Conference has in technological matters, before proceeding to a discussion of the general nature of our preventive security measures, it might be well to consider just one aspect of the why of security in military research and development.

The extensive, sensational, almost fantastic achievements of research and development for military purposes in recent years have contributed immeasurably to the offensive and defensive strength of this country. When viewed in the *absolute* this represents a truly tremendous accomplishment. However, as I see it, the exploitable value of military research and development is only *relative*. The

real measure of worth is found in the *comparative* position of military strength in which it places us in relationship to an enemy at any given time.

It is the relative factor of time which is of the essence, the time it takes the Soviet to neutralize or exceed our gains with developments of their own.


New military weapons follow a cycle from research and development through production and distribution to absorption in operational inventory and tactical utilization. A serious compromise of the properly classified aspects of the project in the research and development phase may result in a loss of nearly all of its strategic or relative value. If the compromise occurs during the production phase the strategic loss is not as great but it is still very substantial. By the time the weapon reaches the tactical units security on remaining classified aspects is still important, but a substantial time lead has already been gained, if no compromise has previously occurred.

Accelerated development has brought upon us a condition where yesterday's achievements are completely inadequate, where many of today's are already obsolescent, and where one of our main hopes for technological superiority lies in being able to conceal for a little while some of the advances which we have programmed for tomorrow. Consequently there is a serious need for good security in the development and production areas of activity.

What I have just stated is true. It is important. But if I were to stop here I would be oversimplifying the problem. It is true that if all that military research and development had produced for us were the musket and cannon ball, it would have been most successful—if the Soviet were still using the bow and arrow. But they are not using bows and arrows. They, too, on their own, have a very substantial and growing technological capability and we must put forth great effort to retain our techno-

(Continued on page 23)

Bad News for Burglars from the Producers of the World's Finest Protective Equipment



Kidde engineer points to inconspicuous Ultrasonic transmitter.

'Silent Sound' Insures Burglar-Proof Three- Dimensional Protection


Using sound waves too high to be heard by the human ear, the Kidde Ultrasonic Burglar Alarm System saturates the entire protected area, wall to wall, floor to ceiling, with a network of 'silent sound' waves that penetrate every cubic inch of space. Any attempt to enter disturbs the wave pattern, instantly triggers an alarm! Even a lock-in doesn't stand a chance, because once the system is turned on, his first move betrays him.

What's more, the unbeatable Kidde system cannot be bypassed or sabotaged without giving an alarm. It can be easily carried by one man and plugs into any standard electrical outlet.

When installed in accordance with regulations of Underwriters' Laboratories the system qualifies for certification. For more information, send today for Kidde's Ultrasonic Alarm Booklet.

Tiny Device Traps Thieves With 'Invisible Light'

Designed specifically for low-cost, efficient protection of out-of-door areas and large indoor spaces, the tamper-proof Kidde Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System projects an invisible beam of 'black light' over an effective range of 900 feet. Through mirrors the beam can be "bent" up to 90°. Any interruption of the 'black light' beam, or any attempt to bypass the system with another light beam disturbs the frequency modulated waves and instantly sounds the alarm.



Security Chief checks alignment of Photo-Electric projector.

The entire system consists of a projector (shown above) and a receiver, each about 10½" long and 6½" in diameter, neither requiring any special wiring. Transistors conserve space, lengthen equipment life, eliminate tube replacement problems. Approved by Underwriters' Laboratories. Ideal for proprietary systems, the Kidde Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System gives the best long distance protection at the lowest possible cost. Write today for Kidde's Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System booklet.

Kidde 

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"THE RAILROAD POLICE"

GEORGE A. CALLAHAN

MANAGER OF PROTECTION SERVICES

THE NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY



BEFORE the railroads, travel and transportation were dangerous and difficult ventures. The wayfarer was always regarded as fair game for the highwayman. Columbus discovered a whole new world seeking a safer and shorter route to the Indies. The stagecoach and the covered wagon have furnished material for those inspiring Wild West stories, but they certainly left much to be desired in the way of comfort and convenience, not to mention safety. In the "good old days" when a passenger (or a shipment) started on a journey, the chances of his ever reaching destination were poor at best.

But with the coming of the railroads, this picture changed completely. For the first time, common carriers successfully met the challenge of the organized outlaw and really accepted the responsibility of transporting people and property over long distances on schedule and with security. While the railroad police could not presume to claim all the credit for this transition, it certainly played a prominent role in an amazing and radical transformation.

Railroad policing started shortly before the Civil War. Its actual beginning is indefinite since each railroad at the outset attempted to meet its own problems independently. At that time there were numerous small railroads, many of which have long since gone out of existence. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, for example, is the result of over 200 consolidations and combinations.

At first, the railroads simply hired outside detective agencies to handle specific cases. Under that arrangement, the reputation of Allen Pinkerton rose to prominence. He was most successful in his activities for the railroads and even thwarted an attempt to murder President-Elect Lincoln aboard a train. Pinkerton subsequently became head of the Union Army intelligence and fathered the U. S. Secret Service.


In the unsettled period after the Civil War, conditions on the railroads rapidly worsened. Freight pilferage was prevalent, train robberies persisted and the displaced hobo population almost took over con-

trol of the freight facilities. The roads soon realized that to succeed, or even survive, security would have to be given much closer attention. So, as a second step in the evolution of the railroad police, conductors, trainmen, gatemen, crossing attendants and others similarly situated were assigned protection responsibilities in addition to their regular duties.

These measures, too, were found to be unsatisfactory and the railroads were finally forced to form their own full-time, specially selected police departments. The chaotic conditions which were then rampant called for outstanding courage and spectacular rem-

(Continued on page 18)

Railroad investigators on a surveillance using television camera and equipment.



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RAILROAD POLICE *Continued*

edies. As a consequence, many of the early railroad police special agents became colorful characters in fact as well as fiction. To their credit, they succeeded in bringing an extremely difficult situation under some control in short order. Basically railroad policing still remains a dangerous occupation. Remote and desolate areas still have to be patrolled at night, in all kinds of weather and under every adverse condition. Many railroad policemen have been killed or seriously injured in line of duty. One mid-western railroad has on display fifteen stars—in badges of their police officers who gave their lives to protect company property.

As the record of the railroad police continued to grow, the States began to take official recognition of the importance of their contribution to law and order. In 1865, Pennsylvania became the first state to authorize the issuance of police commissions to railroad officers. Other states gradually followed, until now all but eight give special authorization to the railroad police.

Today, the railroads have the oldest and largest private police force in the world. They have almost 9,000 police officers stationed in 1,000 cities and towns throughout this country and Canada. They protect 605,792,170,000 ton miles of freight annually. Its value is beyond estimation. Each year they are responsible for the safety of some 500,000,000 passengers, for the patrolling of 400,000 miles of track and the protection of 120,000 passenger and freight stations. Although their efforts are primarily preventive, still they are obliged to make about 60,000 arrests per year for crimes ranging from minor offenses to major felonies. Over the years their record of convictions has consistently run at a commendable 98%.

The railroad police closely resemble the state police in organization and operation. There is a wide range of territory to cover and comparatively few men to do it. This calls for the greatest mobility and

most efficient means of communication. Radio equipped automobiles are a necessity and walkie-talkies are used a great deal.

In addition to usual police problems there are some that are peculiar to the railroads. Everyone and everything is in almost constant motion. It is often a distinct and difficult question just to determine where and when a crime occurred. Usually there are no witnesses. Local authorities are traditionally reluctant to assume jurisdiction in criminal matters, unless it can be conclusively established that the offense occurred well within their jurisdictions. Federal laws dealing with thefts from interstate shipments and crimes committed on passenger trains in interstate movement, however, have proved helpful. Then, too, the authority of the railroad police varies within the several states. In some states, officers are limited in their activities to railroad property. In others they are permitted to extend their operation off the property and pursue their investigations as long as railroad interests are involved. In some emergencies they are obliged to act simply as private citizens. As a matter of practice, however, they almost always function in close cooperation with local law enforcement agencies in matters of importance.

The average officer must be a specialist in two radically different fields—he must be a railroader—he must be a police officer. According to his credentials, he is authorized to protect the property of the company against all acts of depredation; to guard the freight; to protect passengers; to preserve order upon the premises of the company and upon its trains; to uphold and enforce the law so far as the interest of the railroad, its passengers and patrons may be involved and to conduct such investigations as management may require. His patrol duties consist, generally, in the prevention of freight losses and the protection of the traveling public in stations, on trains and at parking facilities.

The case file of a railroad special

agent will include almost every kind of felony: homicide, armed robbery, arson, aggravated assault, burglaries and thefts. To these can be added bad bank checks, baggage losses, suspicious cash shortages and every conceivable kind of complaint. The agent must have some technical training. He must be a proficient photographer, he must be able to prepare and even present cases in court when necessary.

It must be apparent that no one railroad could with any practicality maintain a private police force large enough to be self-sufficient. The railroads must depend upon the local and state police departments, particularly where immediate and often simultaneous action is required at widely separated and remote points. The assistance of federal law enforcement agencies is also used. The F. B. I. because of its broad investigative jurisdiction cooperates in many matters. Postal inspectors come in where the U. S. mails are concerned. Details of the armed services police ride trains and are assigned to some of the larger depots for the traveling serviceman. In addition, the railroad police have common problems with other privately maintained police departments such as the Pullman Company, the Railway Express Agency and the security departments of shippers and consignees.

An excellent example of this close cooperation occurred last December when the rear three cars of a crowded passenger train, bound for Montreal from New York, derailed at Hartford, Connecticut. Railroad and city police were on the scene almost immediately. The fire department and civic organizations responded. The injured were quickly attended, the other passengers were quietly transferred to the head cars and taken to the Hartford railroad station. So well were these efforts coordinated that the name and address of every passenger was secured, materially reducing the claims usually arising from an accident of this type.

The railroad police, in turn,
(Continued on page 20)



An important point for you to consider...

All-aluminum chain link fence costs less than rustable fencing that has been painted once

Around plants, warehouses and other industrial buildings, all-aluminum chain link fencing provides real savings on maintenance costs. In addition, it adds bright beauty to enclosed areas.

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Reynolds Metals Company does not make aluminum fencing. But Reynolds supplies quality

aluminum to leading chain link fencing manufacturers. Their names will be furnished on request. *Reynolds Metals Company, P. O. Box 1800-NK, Louisville 1, Kentucky.*

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RAILROAD POLICE *Continued*

furnish their share of assistance to the local authorities. About two years ago, four long-term prisoners escaped from a Massachusetts state penitentiary. They made directly for the nearest freight yards, located in Providence, R. I., about twenty miles away. There, city and state law enforcement officers, aided and directed by the railroad police, engaged them in a running gun battle. Since the fugitives had crossed the state line in their flight, agents of the F. B. I. also participated. Two of the convicts were recaptured in the freight yards. Two managed to escape, only to be picked up a few hours later by the Connecticut State Police.

The railroad police departments depend most of all on one another. Whenever the cause or place of loss cannot be definitely determined, liability is prorated among the railroads participating in the shipment. Thus, concealed theft, careless checking, improper loading or rough handling may be reflected in the way of financial loss all along the line.

By the very nature of railroad-ing, this police cooperation had to start spontaneously. As long as it remained a matter of favor, it was found wanting. Consequently, the Association of American Railroads, back in 1921, formed what is now known as its Protective Section to organize and further develop this essential coordination. Now, any railroad police official can secure information or initiate action any place in this country or Canada—as a matter of right. The members of this Association have, over the years, learned to exchange experiences freely, to compare methods and generally to function as a single unit rather than a group of voluntarily associated individuals. A monthly newsletter is published. Sectional meetings are held quarterly. Each year, under the auspices of the Association, the National Railroad Police Academy meets in Chicago. Modeled along the lines of the F. B. I. National Police Academy, railroad police officers assemble from all parts of this con-

tinent to be trained in the latest and most scientific methods of crime detection.

Some of the accomplishments of the railroad police can be measured with a fair degree of accuracy. Since 1920, freight shortages have been steadily and substantially reduced. Losses attributable to theft or possible pilferage have shown an even sharper decline. And this despite an increase in volume of traffic and value of shipments over the same period.

During World War II, the railroads transported over 90% of the men and material required for national defense. This, of course, placed a great additional burden on the railroad police. Yet, not one successful case of sabotage was reported.

The police officer is also a strong public relations contact. The constant flow of complimentary letters which all railroads receive for services rendered on the spot by their police officers gives a good indication that the traveling public is grateful for this assistance.

Modern police departments are essentially service organizations for their railroads. An alert police department knows generally what is going on and what, if anything, is wrong with any given operation. It may have practical suggestions for correction. The almost universal practice of floodlighting freight yards, for example, is one which the police have always advocated for preventing thefts from standing freight cars and for reducing accidents.

Railroads are learning to call in their police at the earliest stages of planning and on the highest level of policy making. In the setting up of new systems, in the procurement of new equipment and even the purchase of land, protection officials can be of assistance. One railroad, considering the purchase of a new type of seal, submitted it to its police for study. A little experimentation disclosed that the new seal could be opened and reclosed, without any evidence of tampering, within three minutes. The police were able to suggest a

seal that was not only more secure but also cheaper. On the other hand, new ticket vending machines were installed without police approval. Before they were in operation a month, a ticket clerk who could manipulate them at will was apprehended by the police.

The railroad police have developed their activities to a stage where they are in a position to make positive contributions to the success of the railroad and the security of its passengers and personnel. Progressive managements have come to realize that their protection departments are much more than just the "long arm of the law." They can and should be in all matters of public safety and company security the "eyes and ears of the railroad."

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING FILM TO BE RELEASED

A new industrial security training film entitled, "Symposium on Security," will be released about the first of October by the Department of Defense. This film is designed primarily for showing to audiences of scientific, engineering, and technological personnel employed on sensitive Department of Defense projects. It supplements "The Case of Comrade T" which was released last October.

"Symposium on Security" is a 25 minute, 16mm color film in which top flight civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense and pre-eminent scientific leaders in industry discuss security and its impact on the scientific community. Arrangements for obtaining the film can be made through cognizant security offices of the three military departments after it is released.

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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, July, 1957



Suite 317

This is not the title of a "whodunit" mystery. It is the suite number of the Society's headquarters offices in the Investment Building, Washington, D. C.

As you open the door to Sweet (we mean Suite) 317, you will see a sweet looking girl. She is Miss Virginia Egelston, Staff Secretary in the headquarters of the Society. Miss Egelston is pretty, pert and proficient or you may reverse the order of these adjectives and the description will still be just as accurate. Those of you who served in the FBI may remember her when she was secretary to D. Milton Ladd, former Assistant to the Director.

When you are in Washington, drop in to Suite 317. Miss Egelston will be glad to see you and assist you in every way possible. You now know that you have a place to hang your hat should you visit the Nation's Capital.

From here on out Miss Egelston will supply items of interest in this column.

We will now sign off for column identification— S U I T E 3 1 7.

CREOLE Continued

ployees come from the United States, that is, those who have certain technical or managerial skills which are not yet available in Venezuela in the quantities we need. (I might mention here, that two members of our Board of Directors are Venezuelan citizens as well as many others in executive positions.) We are at present using the services of a national investigative agency to screen these applicants. Where required, special agency investigations are ordered. Since our foreign staff employee virtually lives in a "fish bowl" we try to assure ourselves that he will be a credit to his country and his company.

In recent years the Venezuelan government has embarked on an extensive program of immigration; importing engineers, technicians and farmers in an effort to keep up with the rapidly expand-

ing economy. Most of these people become Venezuelan citizens in a short time after settling here, and quite naturally seek jobs with the oil companies. In tackling this problem we first tried mail and cable (in certain instances) investigations. This method was never satisfactory in trying to deal with leads in foreign countries. Working through affiliated companies, however, we established means to handle investigations directly and by personal interview in several European countries.

FIRE PROTECTION

In a flammable liquids industry fire protection is high on the list of security matters. In the main, fire protection in land operations is essentially the same as in similar installations in the States, with one major exception. For example, Caripito is a village in eastern Venezuela, a town of no more than 4,000

people, and 95% dependent on the Creole refinery and terminal located there. Literally carved out of the jungle with the most rudimentary utilities, it can scarcely be expected to maintain a fire fighting force capable of combating fires at our installation. Therefore, a well organized, well trained volunteer fire group is a real, live necessity for us. Also in the remote areas you just don't tap in on the city water mains. You must lay your own lines.

Another interesting land problem exists at the Amuay Refinery, on the Paraguna peninsula in western "Ven." To handle fluctuating seasonal demands for fuel oil, the refinery built two earthen reservoirs, of four and eight million barrels— not gallons—each. After testing the volatility of the product the Fire Marshal there stated that

(Continued on page 22)

CREOLE *Continued*

if a fire started he would hop in a row boat, paddle across the reservoir and beat it out with the oars. The flash point is that high! Their biggest problem to date has been pelicans. Seems that when it rains for several hours afterwards the water stays on top of the oil. The pelicans from nearby Amuay Bay go fishing in the approved style and wind up stuck bill-first in several million barrels of fuel oil. That is what they claim, anyway.

The problems of fire protection in Lake Maracaibo are unique. For example, just offshore we are building an island marine terminal which will load ocean going tankers. The initial construction stage will contain one-1,800,000 bbl reservoir and four-268,000 bbl Steel Tanks for crude. Crude is not like fuel oil. It contains the so called "Light ends" or more volatile liquids which are later separated in the refining process. Our solution here is large volumes of fire water, fixed monitors plus utilization of harbor tugs equipped with heavy fire-fighting equipment. We have at present on Lake Maracaibo three 42-foot fireboats which have suc-

cessfully extinguished a number of large fires. The fixed installations have the usual first aid and pumping equipment.

DISASTER CONTROL

In the fall of 1954, as an extension of its responsibility for the protection of the corporation's employees and property, the Creole management embarked on a program of disaster control. The Industrial Service organization was assigned the responsibility of staff guidance for this project. Concerning ourselves with catastrophes of natural or industrial origin, we have now reached a stage which we call "a posture of readiness." We have published a manual—again in Spanish and English—of over 100 pages setting up the organization and establishing the functions or job descriptions of each emergency position throughout the company. Individual skills have been inventoried and coded on mechanical sorting cards. If a manager needs eight bulldozer drivers, two underwater demolition experts and three cooks, it is a matter of minutes to sort their identities and complete records from the file. Each of these hundred-page manuals will tell—in

the event of a disaster—who does what with what transportation and communication units, which personnel utilizes what heavy equipment. Evacuation plans for up to 12,000 employees and families are included, in case of epidemic or similar emergency.

We have had a few emergencies in the past, and have learned from them. As the result of a large fire which disrupted camp services we learned that the "garbage detail" is the most popular of all. It seems that the housewives pass out cold beer to the collectors as they make their rounds. And it's all on mechanical sorting cards.

WORKING FOR CREOLE

I get many letters every year from fellows in the States inquiring about working for Creole in Venezuela, so it might be of interest to highlight a few things about our jobs. All you have heard about the high salaries down here is true. Also the high cost of living. Also that under present legislation we pay no U. S. income tax and a nominal Venezuelan income tax on earned income. We employ very few American security men and

(Continued on page 26)

WANTED

Plant Security Director—Large industrial firm needs at once an experienced man to take charge of its industrial security programs. He must be professionally qualified. . . .

Job Placement

L. P. BUCHMAN, Security Manager of the Glenn L. Martin Company, whose friendly countenance you see, is Chairman of the Society's Placement Committee.

Mr. Buchman is one of the early pioneers in the profession of industrial security. He is anxious to help Society members locate jobs should they need one. He requested that the following information be passed on to you!

"In order to service our members in the Industrial Security field, it is the desire of this Committee to have members of the Society report any vacancies that exist in their organization for security personnel. In this way we will be in a better position to service our members.

"In the past year only three positions have been listed with this Committee and we have received approximately twenty-five resumes for employment.

"It is the primary purpose of this Committee to do everything it possibly can in placing members of the Society who are seeking positions."

Should you learn of any job opening, advise Mr. Buchman promptly. It will only take five minutes of your time to do this important duty.

Remember—the man you help today may help you tomorrow.



GENERAL CARROLL *Continued*

logical lead. But technology will not thrive under a pall of secrecy and therefore we must avoid stifling technological advancement by excessive or unrealistic security restrictions. At the same time we must protect our military secrets.

Here is an example of different and competing disciplines which we must learn to adjust to the overall advantage of our national interest. In endeavoring to effect a proper adjustment we must remember that the broad defense problem which dictates our security requirements is the same problem which has occasioned our unprecedented technological development programs. Hence these competing disciplines are inseparable parts of the same general problem and they must be evaluated in a single perspective.

These two competing disciplines are not new in relationship to each other. In reading a passage pertaining to the life of Aristotle some time ago I was intrigued to note the following incident.

Alexander, the Great, as you know was a great military tactician. In his youth he was tutored by Aristotle from whom he learned much of science which he put to good use in his military ventures. On one occasion while campaigning in Asia he learned that Aristotle had published some papers which set forth scientific data of military significance. Alexander must have been very security minded because he wrote a letter to Aristotle in which he said:

"You did wrong in publishing the acromatic parts of science" (that information which is imparted to chosen disciples only). "In what shall we differ from others, if the sublimer knowledge we gained from you be made common to all the world."

I cite this incident merely to indicate that the competing disciplines of science and security have been vying with each other for a long, long time; and it is not too surprising that in this complex modern world of ours we have not as yet found a totally acceptable

solution to our present problem.

Our classified defense information security program is predicated upon a very simple security principle, that is, circulation control. This means permit access to classified information only by those persons who are considered to be trustworthy and who have a need to know in the performance of their official duties.

I have stated that this is a very simple security principle. It is simple in general concept. It is simple in the enunciation. But it is exceedingly complex in application.

There are three main ingredients in this security formula: classification, need to know, and clearance.

In the first "classification," there is involved a determination that a given piece of information, if it falls into the hands of an enemy would do prejudice to the nation, or would cause serious or grave harm to the nation. (This accounts for our graduated classification system of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.) This is a most difficult determination. Considering the complex ramifications of military requirements it is not easy to decide whether or not a given piece of information would be prejudicial or harmful to the nation. Nor is it always easy to determine whether it is realistic or practical to invoke the security system by placing a classification stamp on a piece of paper. Involved also is a determination that we are not withholding unnecessarily from dissemination information which is needed for progress. Progress is dynamic and it depends on information. But, most important of all, involved in this question of classification is a determination that the information under consideration can properly be withheld from the American people. The public must have adequate information if it is properly to administer its affairs. Without an adequate flow of information there is no democracy. On the other hand it is clear that on behalf of the American people we must deny our military secrets to our prospective enemies.

And so at the very outset of our

security formula we run into a requirement for the exercise of high judgment and the achievement of a delicate balance between competing considerations.

The second ingredient in our security formula is "clearance," clearance for access to classified information, a determination of trustworthiness. This involves what is perhaps one of the most controversial and puzzling issues of our day—and understandably so. Because involved here is what assumes the proportions of a conflict between the dictates of security on the one hand and the God-given liberties and the Constitutional rights of the individual on the other. I am sure you are all cognizant at least generally of the problem in this area and of the imperative need to achieve a proper balance between competing considerations in the over-all interest of the people.

The third ingredient in our security formula is "need to know." Here, too, we have a difficult problem because involved here are determinations which affect administrative and operational efficiency which in turn affect economy and progress. I have heard this "need to know" principle characterized as an arbitrary repressive and stifling compartmentalization. It is true that "need to know" is intended to achieve some semblance of compartmentalization, but it is hardly arbitrarily repressive. This is clearly indicated in the following statistics.

In the past eight years in accord with Executive Orders and Department of Defense directives, the Air Force has cleared for access to Secret and Top Secret information well over two million people affiliated with the Air Force. In 1955 alone there were 311,000 such clearances, and in 1956, 366,000. While it is understandably true that the majority of these clearances pertained to military and civilian employees of the Air Force, of the two million clearances granted by the Air Force in the past eight years 435,000 pertained to persons in the scientific and industrial fields who were engaged in classified work be-

(Continued on page 24)

GENERAL CARROLL *Continued*

ing performed under contract with the Air Force. In 1955, 76,316 such clearances were granted. This amounted to 24.5% of all clearances granted during this year. And this ratio is rapidly increasing. In 1956, 121,425 Secret and Top Secret clearances were granted to persons in the scientific and industrial field. This represents 33.2% of all the clearances granted last year by the Air Force in all fields.

Note that these figures I have cited pertain only to Secret and Top Secret and they relate only to Air Force activity. Add to this the great numbers of persons having access to Confidential information, add the volume of the other services and other areas of governmental activity handling defense information and the magnitude of the dissemination we are giving our classified information becomes apparent.

Admittedly these figures do indicate the vast volume of classified information which is being generated, some of which also admittedly is from time to time unrealistic or unnecessarily classified. In this latter connection the Department of Defense has mounted a closely monitored program and is continually exploring ways to reduce drastically this problem of overclassification and to effect early declassification of that information which no longer requires security protection.

While the volume of classified information being generated is responsible in great measure for the high clearance figures I have cited, it has been my experience that to a much greater extent the high number of clearances required is occasioned by the extensive dissemination which is made of classified information. This has been necessitated by the complexities of modern warfare and the information requirements upon which technological progress is predicated. It should be clear that in application our "need to know" principle is not very restrictive. As a matter of fact it has been applied with such deference to technological and

operational requirements that, in practice, its value as a basic security principle has been very materially weakened.

My grandmother used to say, as mayhaps did yours, that if three or more people know a secret—it isn't a secret. Well, whatever validity may attach to that statement, it is certainly representative of the problem that we have in endeavoring to exercise an effective "need to know" control over the dissemination of our military secrets.

Security then competes with freedom of the press and a full flow of information to the public. It interferes with the unfettered exchange of scientific and technological information. It burdens management and complicates administration. It hampers general efficiency and economy of operation. It even conflicts with that element of human nature which resists regimentation and dislikes being saddled with detailed procedural responsibilities. And above all it invades the privacy of the person and tends to compete with his individual Constitutional rights.

Since security, as I have described it, is at odds with so many other considerations, some of you might say: "Why not change the formula? Why not try an entirely different approach?" Well, first of all we would have to think of something better. If we can we should do it. We must always strive for improvement. However the very nature of security involves restriction and it is the restriction that competes with other disciplines. Then, too, we must remember that we have not had the luxury of choice in selecting our methods. They have been forced upon us by the aggressive techniques and tactics of those who would destroy all of our freedoms. It is a necessity of our generation to accept some limitation on our normal liberties lest we have none at all.

The answer lies in coordinating the different disciplines which compete in the security field. In endeavoring to coordinate these disciplines we should remember these considerations.

Our government is not the ubiquitous overlord we see in the dreaded police state of Communist nations. Our security laws and rules and regulations have been developed and are being applied within the framework of democracy, which means in accord with the will of the American people. As Pericles, the leader of the ancient democracy of Athens said of his country:

"We place our trust less in a rigid system or a rigid policy than we do in the feelings and the native spirit of our citizens." Consequently our greatest resource in our security effort is not the rule or the stipulated restraint, but the spirit of the people in applying it.

I know the American people want security. I also know there is a national awareness of the perils of too much security, or of security improperly administered. I know that in our search for safety we want most fervently to avoid any unnecessary or improper intrusion into private affairs and that we want to preserve intact something more than fond memories of lost liberties.

I think we must affirm that we do not seek total security. The total exclusion of all hazard has never been contemplated. It is unthinkable and unobtainable. We do not, therefore, engage in an illusory chase after something we can never get and never want.

Different and competing disciplines are ingrained in the very fabric of our political being. It was in the contest between differing viewpoints that our Constitutional system was born. By yielding here and guaranteeing there we formed a "more perfect union." We learned that not total power, nor a preponderant power on any side, but rather a balanced power was required to establish justice, to provide for the common defense, and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. Out of our society of competing disciplines there developed the concept of "E Pluribus Unum" (One for many). This is what we must

do with the competing disciplines in the security field.

Now, I am not merely mouthing academic niceties here. This is important. We should not as we so often do address ourselves exclusively or preponderantly to one side of the problem while giving only lip service to the other. This merely promotes excesses in one direction or another and almost invariably occasions a subsequent pendulum swing to the opposite extreme. This is what we must do. We must view the competing disciplines in a single over-all perspective of national problem and we must merge them to a point of balance which will support the over-all national interest. I believe we can develop by means of sincere and honest cooperation among the competing disciplines, a sublimated or transcendent discipline which will achieve adequate security without undue infringement upon the legitimate and responsible claims of any discipline. If this is done out of a common impulse that springs from a common understanding, it will have the characteristics, the substance, and the realities of democratic action. In this way in subjecting ourselves to necessary security restrictions we shall not have weakened democracy in surrender but we shall have strengthened it in a shared decision. Especially when national survival is at stake is it imperative that competing disciplines merge into an area of union where the severity of competition recedes in the balancing of peril against peril; where wisdom suggests the leveling of the bumps of contention; and where the interests of each merge with those of the others. This is an area of common understanding and agreement where there is an acknowledgement that a free nation consists of free men, but where there is a corresponding practical recognition that only secure men are free men nowadays.

This business of adjusting ourselves to continuing conflict is difficult especially in the security field. Past security practices were geared largely to emergency situations of short duration. Consequently pub-

lic tolerance was not taxed too severely. And relief came with the termination of the emergency when the need for special security measures disappeared. In our past security practices we have been habituated to wars with a perceptible beginning and end.

But the "war" or conflict which Communism has pressed upon us goes on and on. Our present security measures were born of necessity because of this conflict. They were emergency measures adopted to cope with an emergency situation. But this conflict continues. It has no foreseeable end. Curiously enough we face a sort of permanent emergency and the emergency situation has endured so long it has become our normal way of life.

In this situation there is a tendency to become weary and unbelieving because as a peace loving people we find it difficult to comprehend a "war" or conflict of this kind. But if we should lapse into indifference or carelessness we are indeed endangered.

There is little need to fear a let-down in their chosen fields among our scientists, engineers, technicians, and manufacturers who contribute so measurelessly to our defense. They are stimulated daily and pressed to greater enterprise by professional pride, by tangible result and by the justifiable expectation of reward and recognition. But the requirements of good security do not beckon with the same fascination. There are few if any standards of achievement by which to measure each day's performance. Security does not produce a tangible end product. As a matter of fact security is not an end objective in itself. It merely characterizes something else. Consequently it does not have a built-in incentive such as other fields of endeavor. This incentive must be supplied by a constant awareness of the problem. It must be found in a patriotic self-discipline.

Security is not an exclusive functional activity engaged in only by people designated as security personnel. Security not only cuts across all other disciplines but it is an

inherent part of all other functions having to do with defense matters. Adequate and proper security will be achieved only when the scientist, the engineer, the technician, the administrator, the security officer, the government employee, the man in uniform, and all others involved join in a sincere and continuing effort to make our security program work.

If total peace is to be engineered in a world of total conflict it seems clear that total effort will be required.

In conclusion I would like to leave this thought with you. Since security is beset on all sides by so many competing disciplines it might help to remember that it is in this field of internal security that the Communists have demonstrated their greatest strength; and it is in this same field of internal security that the free world has exhibited its greatest weakness.

A. TYLER PORT *Continued*

Publication and dissemination of educational materials.

This Division handles the production of industrial security training films designed to develop an appreciation for and willingness to comply with security procedures. It exercises staff supervision over the three-week training course for Departmental personnel and the five-day course for industrial personnel, given at Fort Holabird. The Division also prepares and publishes a series of industrial security wall posters, payroll leaflets, and industrial security letters. All of these materials are designed for the information and guidance of industrial management and industrial employees handling classified Defense information.

Another important activity under Mr. Port's cognizance is the Industry Advisory Committee which was established to advise the Department of Defense with respect to proposed policies and procedures and to recommend solutions to major problems encountered in the administration of the Industrial Security Program. The Com-

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A. TYLER PORT Continued

mittee consists of 15 members of industrial concerns. Mr. Port is Chairman and Mr. Applegate is Vice-Chairman. The members of the Committee are as follows:

Eric Barr, *General Dynamics Corporation*

R. R. Blackwell, *General Motors Corporation*

C. W. Brabston, *Michael Baker, Inc.*

L. P. Buchman, *Glenn L. Martin Company*

John L. Buckley, *Varian Associates*

Harry Crow, *Johns Hopkins University*

Glenn V. Dierst, *Boeing Airplane Company*

B. F. Fitzsimons, *Douglas Aircraft Company*

Paul Hansen, *Reynolds Metals Company*

J. J. Jacoppi, *Western Electric Company, Inc.*

Gerald P. Kavanaugh, *Hercules Powder Company*

David Lester, *Hupp Corporation*

E. B. Olive, *Cameron Iron Works*

J. A. Ranallo, *Thompson Products, Inc.*

Russell E. White, *General Electric Company*

The Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review is shown as a Division on the chart. It is, however, an Office of which Mr. Port is also Director. This Office has to do with the administrative procedures governing the disposition of all cases in which a Military Department has made a recommendation or determination with respect to the denial, suspension or revocation of a clearance of a contractor or contractor employee. In this Office there is a Central Screening Board and three regional hearing boards located in San Francisco, Chicago and New York. There is also a Central Review Board. In his capacity as Director of the Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review, Mr. Port is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force for administering the Industrial Personnel Security Review Program including its constituent boards.

The Administrative Security Pro-

grams Division, headed by Colonel Gordon E. Dawson, U. S. Army, develops Departmental security programs such as the military personnel security program, the Department of Defense civilian applicant and employee security program (Executive Order 10450), the uniform policy on investigation and clearance of Department of Defense personnel for access to classified defense information, and the policies and programs relating to the safeguarding official information in the interests of the defense of the United States (Executive Order 10501). It also develops policies for the physical security of buildings at the Seat of Government occupied, in whole or in part, by the Department of Defense. There are 55 such buildings of which the Pentagon is one. The Division also handles United States security programs in connection with NATO and other international defense organizations, such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

The Security Services Division, of which Mr. George J. Gould is Staff Director, takes care of the security of all elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This includes handling the security clearances for all civilian and military personnel employed in or assigned to duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as providing security services for a number of outstanding agencies having contact with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This Division also handles the physical security and the implementation of procedures for the safeguarding of classified information within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The numerous security policies and programs of the Department of Defense, the more important of which have been described, are developed in close collaboration with the three Military Departments. Extensive coordination and exacting staff work of the highest order are required to develop, establish and promulgate these very important and far-reaching policies.

Mr. Port welcomes suggestions and constructive criticism for the improvement of Department of De-

fense security programs. The future will give members of the Society and others in the industrial security profession an opportunity to help him carry out this important mission which is essential to our national security.

CREOLE Continued

virtually no beginners. We usually look for a man with several years of law enforcement and security supervisory experience. The starting salaries are in the neighborhood of \$15,000 per year depending on experience. The future is up to the individual.

I believe our benefits are unusual. There is a marvelous section in the local labor law requiring the payment of "utilidades" or profit sharing. Any company which makes a profit must share up to 10% of it with its employees, but not to exceed two months' salary. So in practice we get paid fourteen months every year. Retirement is at 60 or may be as early as 50 with 25 years of service. For each 5 years of overseas service you may retire one year earlier. Retirement amounts to an annual salary equivalent to 3% of the total amount earned less a discount for early retirement.

Our vacation plan for the foreigner is different, as well. At the end of the first year and odd years thereafter we receive two weeks local leave. Any travel is for the employee's account. After two years, and on the following even years, the employee is given six weeks vacation plus boat travel and stop-over time at the embarkation point, plus mileage to his point of origin in the U. S. for himself and family at company expense.

But don't get the idea that all this is a soft touch under a tropical moon. We have the tropical moon, all right, but in the field we have a 48 hour week, and in Maracaibo and Caracas a 40 hour week—even though most of us with corporate wide responsibilities put in far more than forty hours. Sure we've got lots of problems, but I love the life I lead. And don't anybody try to cut off my "utilidades!"

